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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 
PlaintiffiRespondent, 1 
Supreme Court Case No. 36629-2009 
VS. 1 
I 






TWO JINN, INC, 1 
Real Party in Interest-Appellant. ) 
1 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the District Court of the First 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho 
In and For the County of Kootenai 
HONORABLE JOHN T. MITCHELL 
Presiding Judge 
Robyn Fyffe Kar~n D. Jones 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY, & BARTLETT, LLP Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 2772 IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Bo~se,  ID 83701 PO Box 83720 
(208) 343-1000 Bo~se, ID 83720-0010 
~~vffe@nbmlaw.com (208) 334-4550 
Attorneys for Appellant Attorneys for Respondent 
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11. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. 'The Magistrate Abused its Discretion in Concluding That the Interests of Justice 
Required Forfeiture of the Bond. 
1. Tlte magistrate failed to apply the correct legal standard. 
In denying Two Jinn's motion after determining whether it would "not be just to let the 
forfeiture stand" instead of whether justice required enforcement of the forfeiture, the magistrate 
failed to act consistently with applicable legal standards. In this appeal, the state contends that 
the C o ~ ~ r t  should not consider this aspect of the magistrate's abuse of discretion because the 
specific argument was not made on intevmediate appeal to the district court. Respondent's Brief, 
pg. 4-5. However, the relevant principal is that appellants may not raise issues in the higher court 
difterent from those presented in the interinediate court. Coopev v. Bourd of Professioizal 
Disciplirze of Idaho, 134 Idaho 449,456,4 P.3d 561, 568 (2000); Wood v. Wood, 124 Idaho 12, 
17, 855 P.2d 473, 478 (Ct. App. 1993). The issue raised on appeal before the district court is the 
same as that raised in the instant appeal: whether the magistrate abused its discretion in  denying 
Two Jinn's motion for relief from forfeiture. In both appeals, Two Jinn argued that the district 
court abused its discretion by failing to reach its decision consistently with applicable legal 
standards. See Appellant's Brief on Intermediate Appeal (3-24-2009) pg. 5. It is not necessary 
that the arguments raised in support of that issue precisely mirror each other in each appeal. Two 
Jinn's argument on appeal that the magistrate abused its discretion in part by applying the 
incorrect legal standard can be properly considered by this Court 
The state also asserts that Two Jinn's argument is based on "semantics rather than 
substance." Respondent's Brief, p. 6. However, contrary to the state's argument, whether it 
would be just to let the forfeiture stand is not the same inquiry as whetherjustice requires 
enforcement of the forfeiture. In addition to the two potential conclusions suggested by the state 
on page seven of its brief- justice requires or does not require the forfeitui-e's enforcement - the 
trial court could concl~rde that although justice did 1101 necessarily require a forfeiture's 
enforcement, it would not be unjust to let the forfeiture stand. In such a situation, application of 
the standard articulated by the magistrate would result in denial of a motion for exonel-ation 
whereas application of the col-rect legal standard should result in some relief from forfeiture. 
2. Tlie magistrate incorrectly weighed the state's failure to seek extradition 
against Two Jinn, rather than applying that factor in Two Jinn's favor. 
The state contends that t.he rnagisti-ate properly weighed the fact the state had not 
requesied extradition against Two Sirin because Two Ji~in failed to notify the state of MI-. Harris's 
location or otherwise. ask i t  to seek extradition. The state acknowledges that Two Jinn informed 
the state of Mr. Harris's location via its motion to exonerate but appears to consider the state's 
failure to act on that information by initiating extradition proceedings to be irrelevant. Two Jinn 
filed its motion to exonerate with the attached investigators' affidavits and copies of Mi-. Harris's 
identification and fingerprint cards on August 1, 2008, which was just over a week after Two 
Jinn found him on July 22,2008. R. 106-133; see also Tr. (5-27-2009) p. 12, In. 10-14 ("within 
eight days of [Two Jinn] having notice of where [Mr. Ilairis] was at, the State had notice of 
where he was at"). Had the state acted on the notice of Mr. Harris's location and initiated the 
extradition process, that fact could have properly been considered by the magistrate neai-ly three 
months later on October 31,2008 in deciding whether to exonerate the bond. See State v. Quick 
Release Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho 651,655, 167 P.3d 788,792 (Ct. App. 2007) (reversing because 
trial court abused its discl-etion in only considering information presented within 90 days of 
forfeiture order and providing that on remand the trial court could consider ultimate disposition 
of case in determining whether j~~st ice  I-equired the forfeiture's enfoi-cement). Instead, the state 
failed to exhibit an interest in prosecuting Mr. Harris for his probation violation by promptly 
taking steps to extradite him once notified of his location, This lack of interest should have been 
weighed in 'Two Jinn's favor. 
In light of Oregon law prohibiting bail agents From arresting fugitives, Two Jinn did 
everything that it could to bring Mr. Harris before the court by investigating his whereabouts, 
attempting to convince him to surrender once it found him and notifying the state of his location 
via its motion to exonerate. The state could have acted on the iiiformation provided by Two Jinn 
by initiating extradition and i t  was unnecessary for Two Jin~i to spell out that option for the state 
beyond notifying it of Mr. Hairis's location on August I ,  2008. 
Although a trial cou~l  could properly exercise its discretion in declining to exonerate the 
bond after electing not to give dispositive weight to the state's failure to exhibit an interest in 
prosecuting the defendant by requesting extradition, here, the magistrate failed to properly apply 
that factor because it weighed the state's lack of interest against exoneration, rather than in Two 
Jinn's favor. Accordingly, the magistrate's decision to refuse to set aside any of the forfeiture 
was not reached through an exercise of reason or consistently with applicable legal standards. 
3. The magistrate failed to recognize how the purpose of bail is effectuated 
through rules providi~lg for relief from forfeiture. 
In addition to considering that extradition had not been sought, the magistrate found that 
exoneration was unwarranted because Two Jjnn failed to effectuate Mr. Harris's appearance on 
his court date and that it should seek to recover its losses from co-signors on the bond. Tr. (10- 
31-09) p. 7, In. 18 - p. 8, in. 3; p. 10, In. 7-14. As argued i n  Two Jinn's opening brief, the 
magistrate's reasoning fails to recognize that bail is not to punish the surety for the defendant's 
failure to appear or to provide the state with a windfall but to effectuate the accused's appearance 
In court. See Qr~ick Release Bail Boizils, 144 Idaho at 655, 167 P.3d at 792. 'The potential for 
relief from forfeiture provides an important financial incentive for bail agents to locate fugitives 
and return them to court. See C o ~ ~ n t y  of Los Arzgeles v. Aniericai? Contractors Ii'dent. Co., 152 
CaI.App.4th 661,666 (Cal. App. 2007); State v. Ainador, 648 P.2d 309, 312-13 (N.M. 1982) 
The state "disagrees that the purpose of a bail bond is to provide a surety with a financial 
incentive to loccrie a fugitive." Respondent's Brief, p. 9 (emphasis in original). The state's 
assertion ignores the critical role bail agents play in situations where a defendant absconds 
"Hunting for defendants who have jumped bail is a time-consuming and often dangerous job." 
Antericaiz Coneroctors Iizcleiii. Co., 152 Cal.App.4th at 668. Bar1 agents will not undertake lh~s 
endeavor i T  it is ilnlikely to result in relief from forfeiture. In discussing the rationale prompting 
California to address this issue legislatively, the court in Aii~ericaiz Coiztractors litdem. Co. noted 
that prior to the pertinent amendment: 
absconding defendants could live freely in other states and countries because they 
had committed no crimes in thosejurisdictions and the California prosecutors had 
not put warrants for their arrest into the nationwide or international warrant 
system. Bail agents had little incentive to hunt for these bail-jumpers because, as 
the Assembly Committee on Public Safety explained in its analysis of subdivision 
(g), "[ilf the defendant is then located out of state, but is not in custody, and the 
district attorney chooses not to extradite, the bond will not be vacated." 
Furthermore, if the bail agent attempted to arrest the defendant and return him to 
California "he [risked] kidnapping charges in the other state, on a case in which 
the district attorney has decided not to pursue prosecution." The Assembly 
Committee report concluded "[ilf a bail agent cannot be assured that once he has 
located the defendant bail will be exonerated," even if the district attorney chooses 
not to seek extradition, "it is not economically feasible for him to invest the 
considerable f~incls necessary to locate these fugitives." 
Aiizerican Coii.trr~c.tors 11~deii7. Co., 152 Cal.App.4th at 664-65 (footnotes omitted). 
The policy concerns that prompted the enactment of CaliFomia's legislation are equally 
applicable in determining whether justice requires a foi.feit~tre's enforcement, which is an appeal 
to the conscience of the court that should take into account the policies underlying bail and 
forfeiture. See also State 1). de la Hoya, 819 A.2d 467,470 (N.J. 2003) (paramount among 
considerations fol- determining whether justice irequires enforcment of a forfeiture is the necessity 
of providing an incentive to the surety to take active and reasonable steps to recapture a fugitive 
defendant) 
The state contrasts the public policy disfavoring forfeitures with the public policy in 
effectuating a clefendant's appearance in court. See Respondent's Briel, p. 15. However, as 
recognized by other courts, these two policies go hand in hand. In Anlador,' the court indicated: 
In order to promote the purpose of bail, i t  is desirable that bondsmen be 
encoutaged to enter into bail contracts. And, althoilgh the bondsman's obligation 
is to guarantee the defendant's presence I-ather than produce him at trial . . . the 
bondsman nevertheless aids in the administration of justice when he acts to 
protect his financial interest by producing the defendant. Strict application of 
forfeiture statutes rliscozirages bondsmeiz fron!. giving bail or producing the 
clefendc~izt . . . . considering the purposes of bail and the policy to encourage 
bondsmen to enter into bail contracts, it is unjust to enrich the state treasury when 
a bondsman has been diligent in his efforts to apprehend and bring back for trial a 
defendant but has been thwarted by the actions of another sovereign jurisdiction. 
Anzador, 648 P.2d 309, 312-13 (emphasis added); see also American Contractors I~zdern. Co., 
152 Cal.App.4th at 665-66 (strict construction of forfeiture statutes in surety's favor "not so 
much for the bail bond companies" but to serve public interest by encouraging bail agents to 
' Anzador was cited favorably in State v. Fry, 128 Idaho 50,52,910 P.2d 164, 166 (Ct. 
App. 1994). 
retum fleeing defendants to face trial and punishment). 
The state cites to a number of cases from other jul-isdictions which support its narrow 
reading of when relief from forfeiture should be available. These cases, and the state's 
 reasoning, discourage bail agents from locating absconclel-s and should not be considered 
persuasive by this Court. Despite any surety's besi, efforts to supervise a defendant, i t  is 
inevitable that some defendants will flee the jurisdiction and fail to appear in court. If Idaho 
considered the failure to appear to be the end of the matter for the surety, who assumed the risk 
and should now have to pay or collect from its co-signors, then there would be no purpose in 
providing for I-elief from forfeiture. Instead, court rule and statute provide for automatic relief 
from forfeiture where the defendant is brought before the court within 180 days or, where the 
defendant's return cannot be effectuated, allows the court to set aside the forfeiture in whole or in 
part if justice does not requii-e its enforcement. See I.C. $ 19-2922(5); I.C.R. 46(h) & (k). This 
authority demonstrates that Idaho recogriizes the ci-itical role that  the surety's financial incentive 
in obtaining relief from foifeiture plays in returning absconders to justice. 
The state belittles Two Jinn's efforts in attempting to bring Mr. Harris before the court 
because it ultimately was unsuccessful. Respondent's Brief, p. 9-10. This Coitrt should 
recognize, however, the value of Two Jinn's investigation and the value of encouraging similar 
investigations i n  the future. Rather than simply allowing the fol.feiture to stand and collect from 
the co-signor, Two Jinn found Mr. Hanis and attempted to convince him to return. Also, as a 
result of its efforts, the state was informed of his location and could havesought extradition. If 
Two Jinn had found Mr. Harris in Washington, instead of Oregon, it c o ~ ~ l d  have simply arrested 
him and obtained automatic exoneration. That Mr. HaIris had still not been brought before the 
court at the time the magistrate denied Two Jinn's  notion on Octobel- 31; 2008 was not for want 
of Two Jinn's efforts but, rather, a combination of Oregon law, the state's lack of interest in 
extradition and Mr. Harris's refusal to return voluntarily. Two Jinn does not suggest that anytime 
it exercises diligence in attempting to locate a defendant it should receive a full exoneration. 
However, where those efforts result in finding the defendant and making his location known to 
the state, the results of its investigation should be properly considered by the court in determining 
whether justice requires enfoi-cement of the entire forfeiture. 
The magistrate failed to apply the correct legal standard or to apply the relevant factors in 
a manner that furthered the purpose underlying bail and relief from forfeitul-c. Accordingly, the 
magistrate failed to leach its decision to refuse to set aside any of the forfeitiire through an 
exercise of reason 01- consistently with applicable legal standards. 
111. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in its opening brief, Two Jinn rcspectf~~lly aslcs that 
this Court vacate the district court's order affirming the magistrate's denial of Two Jinn's Motion 
to Exonerate and remand this case for entry on an order exonerating the bond. 
Respectfully submitted this j_$_ day of December, 2009. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
Attorneys for Two Jinn, Inc 
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